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Abstract 
Investments in the cyber domain are subject to constraints that may be similar to those in other 
domains, such as cost and effectiveness. However, cyber is a dynamic domain where the 
effectiveness and efficiency of investments are harder to measure. The interdependency of 
assets poses an additional challenge to make decisions on investments for the cyber domain. 
Therefore, organizations need to answer hard questions: whether, how much, and when to invest 
in cybersecurity. Analyzing the attack surface of a system or an enterprise in cyberspace, 
prioritizing assets according to their business values, and quantifying cybersecurity risk in 
monetary values would help to make better decisions while choosing a risk management 
strategy. The aim of this article is to develop a risk-informed cybersecurity investment decision 
model by considering the ripple effects in an organization based on the Functional Dependency 
Network Analysis (FDNA) methodology. Several simulations are conducted to test the 
effectiveness of the developed model. 
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Introduction 
The acquisition of cybersecurity products has different characteristics than other 
equipment and services. For example, a production machine that is acquired has measurable 
inputs and outputs that can be compared with the existing systems and other available systems 
on the market. Cybersecurity products and services typically do not generate anything, but 
rather prevent unwanted cyber incidents from occurring. It leads to the point that when nothing 
happens, it actually means that the cybersecurity products and services are doing their jobs 
well. With the uncertainty of the likelihood of an attack occurring, assessing the impact of an 
attack and reducing its possible consequences gains more importance. 
In order to measure the impact of cybersecurity acquisition, an organization needs to 
know how an asset contributes to the main processes that add value to the organization since 
the return on investment of cybersecurity products and services can be observed as it affects 
the business processes. The purpose of this study is to provide a methodology to quantify the 
impact propagation from assets of an organization to its business processes. 
The sections of this study are summarized as follows: Literature Review on Calculating 
Economic Value of Cyber Risk and Cost of Cyber Incidents provides a literature review relating 
to the challenges of risk analysis methods and calculating the economic value of risk. The 
Method section gives details about the developed methodology. The Simulation and Results 
section presents simulation results, and the Conclusion section concludes the study.  
Literature Review on Calculating Economic Value of Cyber Risk and Cost of 
Cyber Incidents 
Information security economics and cybersecurity investment have been the focus of 
academic studies for years. The number of publications has been increasing due to escalating 
expenditures and loss from a security breach apart from the technical problems. Scholars 
suggest different methods to help organizations decide how to invest in cybersecurity to protect 
operational excellence and intellectual property. Prominent studies to increase the effectiveness 
of cybersecurity investments are reviewed below. 
Previous work has addressed several types of problems. For example, Gordon and Loeb 
(2002) investigate the amount to invest in cybersecurity and determine that a small fractional 
amount of the expected loss is optimal. Arora, Hall, Pinto, Ramsey, and Telang (2004) suggest 
taking a risk management approach to evaluate information security solutions. They indicate 
that security managers should consider a risk-based return on investment (ROI) method to 
decide how to invest in cybersecurity to allow for the many uncertainties in the cyber domain. 
Other works apply various methods to determine optimal cybersecurity investment. For 
example, Cavusoglu, Raghunathan, S., & Yue (2008) and Fielder, Panaousis, Malacaria, 
Hankin, and Smeraldi (2016) compare game theory and optimization for benchmarking the 
efficiency of cybersecurity investments. 
Cyber defense is often applied to comply with standards and best practices, which is an 
expensive task that requires investment in people, processes, and technology (Tatar, Çalik, 
Çelik, & Karabacak, 2014). Investments in the cyber domain are subject to constraints, such as 
cost and effectiveness, which may appear to be similar to decisions in more traditional domains. 
However, cyber is a dynamic risk with the effectiveness of investments being complex and 
unpredictable. For example, not all vulnerabilities will be exploited, but the potential remains 
until updates or patches have been successfully performed. These situations create questions 
for organizations on whether, how much, when, and how to invest in cybersecurity. 
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Morse and Drake (2012) developed a methodology to cope with acquisition risk. To 
make risk assessment more realistic and objective, they proposed a methodology to quantify 
acquisition risks through data-driven monetization. Cybersecurity is not within the scope of their 
study, but the core is calculating risk in monetary values as in this research. Shultz and Wydler 
(2015) studied the integration of cybersecurity into the acquisition life cycle, which involves a 
shift from bolt-on to built-in security. They describe how the government is moving from 
compliance-based requirements to a risk-based cybersecurity management framework to 
integrate cybersecurity into program acquisition and execution support. Erickson (2016) 
proposed that the Navy should develop a holistic scoring of cybersecurity standards/controls to 
optimize cybersecurity investments in a constrained environment. Kaestner et al. (2016) 
recommend that assets at risk must first be inventoried and used to estimate the potential 
losses of a cyberattack, which is a goal of the case study portion of this paper. 
Research on the topics of the economics of cyber risk and cyber insurance—the primary 
method of risk transfer—has been increasing. This highlights the relevance of the topic from 
both a practical and an academic perspective (Eling & Schnell, 2016). Current methods 
commonly put more emphasis on technology and less on people, processes, and 
socioeconomic risk factors (Spears, 2005; Tatar et al., 2016). Major risk assessment 
approaches, such as the ISO/IEC 27001 and 27002 standards, are designed based on security 
control domains and focus more on an asset’s security posture while ignoring preparedness 
towards a set of high-risk loss scenarios (Ruan, 2017). One of the major problems of actuaries 
working in the insurance sector or enterprise risk management is the quantification of cyber risk. 
Most security companies keep incident and loss data as proprietary to maintain a competitive 
advantage (Ruan, 2017). Subsequently, there is not enough data to employ statistical methods 
and mathematical models for appropriate calculations and predictions. This scarcity of data 
leads analysts to rely on scenario approaches rather than the use of the classical stochastic 
modeling (Lloyd’s, 2015). For Rakes et al. (2012), employing expert judgment to define worst-
case scenarios and estimate their likelihood for high-impact IT security breaches is a more 
efficient approach. A fast-changing technology environment requires a modeling approach that 
dynamically measures risk (Eling & Schnell, 2016). 
Cybersecurity requires a risk-informed approach to make effective decisions. CISOs 
need to increase the effectiveness of securing organizations from cyber threats by providing 
information in a form that allows corporate boards and top management to make optimal 
cybersecurity investments. The next section provides a case study that illustrates a quantitative 
approach for making decisions on risk management techniques to use for a cyberattack.  
Method 
In this study, the Functional Dependency Network Analysis (FDNA) developed by 
Garvey and Pinto (2009) is adapted to the cybersecurity domain in order to assess impact 
propagation among the entities of an enterprise. In this section, we introduce the FDNA method 
and explain how it is adapted to cybersecurity.  
Original FDNA  
Functional Dependency Network Analysis (FDNA) is a methodology based on graph 
theory. It helps decision-makers assess the ripple effects among supplier and dependent nodes 
of an enterprise. The purpose of FDNA is to assess how the failure of some systems (entities) 
affects the operability of other dependent systems within an enterprise. The enterprise is 
visualized as a directed graph based on the dependencies among entities, which represent 
specific functionalities within the operation of the enterprise (Garvey & Pinto, 2009).  
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Enterprise is represented as a capability portfolio, which is a functional dependency 
network where the capabilities are fed by the functions of the enterprise. A functional 
dependency network consists of feeder nodes, receiver nodes, and feeder and receiver nodes, 
as it is depicted in Figure 1. Feeder nodes are also called supplier nodes, parent nodes, or leaf 
nodes. The operation of feeder nodes does not rely on any other nodes. Receiver nodes are 
also called dependent nodes or child nodes. Receiver nodes' operation is dependent on other 
nodes, and no other nodes are dependent on them. Other nodes are both dependent on some 
other nodes and predecessor to some other nodes. 
 
  
Figure 1. FDNA Capability Portfolio.  
Tatar (2019). 
FDNA Algebra 
In FDNA, a dependency exists when the operation of a receiver node partially or 
fully depends on a feeder node. The dependency of node j on node i is illustrated in 
Figure 2, where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 indicate the operability of nodes i and j, respectively.  
  
Figure 2. FDNA Dependency Relationship 
Operability indicates to what extend the node performing its function (i.e., its level of 
performance). If a node is fully functioning, its operability is 100 utils, and if it is completely 
inoperable, its operability value is 0 utils. This measure is not necessarily linear. The physical 
(countable/measurable) output does not have to affect the operability value linearly. This 
relationship between the measurable output of the system and the operability value of the 
relevant FDNA node is determined based on the perception and expectations of the user. In 
FDNA algebra, operability values are employed as the measure of performance for each node 
rather than the physical output of the relevant system. 
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0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ≤ 100 
The dependency relationship is determined by two parameters, 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 values. The 𝛼𝛼 
and 𝛽𝛽 values represent the Strength of Dependency (SOD) and Criticality of Dependency 
(COD), respectively. SOD is about how much of the receiver node’s operation depends on the 
operation of the feeder node. COD is determined based on the degree that the dependent 
node’s operation would degrade in the case that the receiver node is not operable for a long 
time. 𝛼𝛼 can have values from 0 to 1, and 𝛽𝛽 can have a value from 0 to 100.  
0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
Operability of a receiver node, 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗, is determined by a function of values of 𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽, and 
operability of the feeder node, as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑓𝑓�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖� , 0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 , 0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ≤ 100 
Where 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 are operability of nodes j and i, respectively, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is SOD fraction, and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 
is COD fraction. The operability of the receiver node is determined as the minimum of SODPj 
and CODPj.  
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗� 
These values are computed using the following equation:  
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� ,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� 
In the case that there are 𝑀𝑀 feeder nodes, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 is calculated by taking an average of 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 values for each feeder node, and 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 t is calculated by taking the minimum of 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 values for each feeder node. 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗1, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗2, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗3, … , 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗� 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�  
 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀�𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗1,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗2,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗3, … ,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗� 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  
Where 0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 , 0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ≤ 100, 𝑃𝑃 = 1,2,3, … ,𝑀𝑀 
How to assign 𝜶𝜶 and 𝜷𝜷 values 
Determining the degree of dependency of nodes is an essential step of FDNA. Firstly, 
the strength of dependency parameter, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, is determined. Then, the criticality of dependency 
parameter, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, is determined.  
The baseline operability level (BOL) is the operability value of a receiver node when its 
feeder node’s operability is zero. In order to find the 𝛼𝛼 value, the following question is asked: 
What is the operability value of the receiver node when its feeder node is wholly inoperable? 
The answer is equal to the baseline operability value. Baseline operability value equation from 
which the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is retrieved is presented below: 
𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 = 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� 
If the answer to the question is 0, then 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is 0; if the answer is 40, then 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is 0.6; if the 
answer is 100, then 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is 0. While the strength of dependency increases, the baseline 
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operability level decreases, and vice versa. 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 can have a value greater than or equal to 0 and 
less than or equal to 1. 
The criticality of dependency indicates how the receiver node’s operability degrades 
from its baseline operability level when the feeder node is inoperable in some extend. In 
calculations, this effect is considered as the receiver’s operability level that is constrained by its 
feeders’ operability levels. In this case, 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 cannot be higher than 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 for all feeder nodes. 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 
can have a value greater than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 100. 
Adapting FDNA for Cyber Impact Assessment  
FDNA is modified in order to adapt the cyber domain and conduct cybersecurity 
acquisition impact assessment. The modifications include introducing assets to business 
processes impact propagation model and inoperability impact propagation of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability. 
Impact Propagation from Assets to Business Processes 
In order to measure the impact of cybersecurity acquisition, an organization needs to 
know how an asset contributes to the main processes that add value to the organization. The 
reason for this is that return on investment on cybersecurity products and services can be 
observed as it affects the business processes. In order to make this assessment, impact 
propagation needs to be analyzed among the entities of the organization. These entities are 
either assets or business processes. The corresponding definitions are provided below. 
Business processes are the organizational goals that add value to the organization (Bahşi, 
Udokwu, Tatar, & Norta, 2018; Jakobson, 2011; Shameli-Sendi, Aghababaei-Barzegar, Cheriet, 
2016).  
Assets include any hardware, software, data, and people of the organization, and contribute to 
the realization of the business processes (Bahşi et al., 2018; Jakobson, 2011; Shameli-Sendi et 
al., 2016). 
Assets belong to the asset level, and business processes belong to the business 
process level. The operations of some assets depend on other assets. The viability of the 
business processes is dependent on the assets. A sample functional dependency network is 
depicted in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Dependency Relationships Among Entities of an Organization 
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Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability Dependency 
Generating a graph of an organization that depicts the dependency relationships is not 
sufficient to assess the impact propagation. Cybersecurity studies and practice heavily depend 
on confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) concepts. The National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST; 2013) has established the CIA concept as a fundamental aspect of 
security controls and assessment. NIST security controls “are designed to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information that is processed, stored, and transmitted 
by those systems/organizations."   
Confidentiality means “preserving authorized restrictions on information access and 
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information” (NIST, 
2013). 
Integrity means “guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and 
includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity” (NIST, 2013). 
Availability means “ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information” (NIST, 
2013). 
It is crucial to determine how the entities of an organization depend on each other from 
the perspective of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The dependency relationship 
between the two nodes is presented in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Dependency Relationship Between Two Nodes 
The 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 values are separately assigned as it was discussed in the How to Assign 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 
Values section from confidentiality, integrity, and availability perspectives. Then, their average is 
taken as the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 values. 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(𝐶𝐶, 𝐼𝐼,𝐴𝐴) =




𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(𝐶𝐶) + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(𝐼𝐼) + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(𝐴𝐴)
3
 
After 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 values assigned, impact propagation assessment is conducted using the FDNA 
algebra.  
Simulation and Results 
The developed model is simulated in a sample organization. Simulations were 
conducted on the network presented in Figure 5. This network consists of six assets, and the 
organization has two business processes. 
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Figure 5. Simulation Network 
 
Functional dependencies among the assets and how they relate to the business 
processes are presented in Figure 5. In order to keep the simulation simple, the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 
values were assigned equal for all dependency relationships, as provided in Table 1. These 
numbers indicate that the confidentiality and integrity of the network entities, including assets 
and business processes, are relatively more dependent on other entities.  
 
Table 1. and Values for the Dependencies 
  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 
Average 0.433 43.33 
C 0.6 25 
I 0.5 35 
A 0.2 70 
 
When all assets are fully operational, the operability values of both business processes 
are equal to 100 (i.e., fully operable). Different disruption scenarios cause operability loss on the 
business processes. In the first scenario, only one asset is failed. In the second scenario, two 
assets become inoperable at the same time. In the third scenario, three or four assets become 
inoperable. In the fourth scenario, a cybersecurity product, an antivirus software, is acquired for 
the assets, and its effects on the business processes are benchmarked. 
Even though all the assets look the same in importance, the simulation scenarios show 
that some, among others, have a more critical position within the functional dependency 
network that causes them to be more important than others when ripple effects are taken into 
consideration. 
Only One Asset Becomes Inoperable 
In this scenario, one asset fails at a time, and their impact propagation is calculated 
based on these inputs. The resulted impact on the business processes is presented in Figure 6 
for comparison. 
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Figure 6. Only One Asset Becomes Inoperable 
 
As it can be observed, the most significant impact on Business Process 1 (BP1) is 
caused by Asset 1 (A1). Its operability value decreases by 56.67 utils. On the other hand, BP2 
is affected significantly when A4 becomes inoperable. Neither BP1 nor BP2 is significantly 
affected when A2 or A3 fails to operate.  
Two Assets Become Inoperable Simultaneously 
In this scenario, two assets fail at the same time, and their impact propagation is 
calculated based on these inputs. The resulted impact on the business processes is presented 
in Figure 7 for comparison.  
 
 
Figure 7. Two Assets Become Inoperable 
 
As can be observed, the most significant impact on both Business Process 1 (BP1) and 
BP2 is caused by the inoperability of Asset 1 (A1) and A4 at the same time. Their operability 
values decrease by 56.67. When A2 or A3 fails to operate at the same time, the effect is much 
less than the inoperability of the other pairs. 
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Three or Four Assets Become Inoperable Simultaneously 
In this scenario, three or four assets fail at the same time, and their impact propagation 
is calculated based on these inputs. The resulted impact on the business processes is 
presented in Figure 8 for comparison.  
 
  
Figure 8. Three or Four Assets Become Inoperable 
 
As it can be observed, the most significant impact on both Business Process 1 (BP1) 
and BP2 is observed in the cases that Asset 1 (A1) and A4 becomes inoperable at the same 
time regardless of A2 and A3. Their operability values decrease by 56.67. The similarities in the 
numbers and the critical assets are mainly caused by taking the 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 values for all 
dependency relations. 
Mitigation Scenario Applied 
In this scenario, a risk mitigation strategy is applied to the simulation network. Suppose 
that the organization acquires an antivirus product. This product prevents an asset from 
becoming wholly inoperable when an attack occurs; instead its operability decreases to 50. The 
resulted impact on the business processes is compared with the scenario without mitigation 
action in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9. Outcomes of Risk Mitigation Action When Four Assets Become Inoperable 
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In Figure 10, outcomes of the same mitigation action are compared with the case that 
only A1 and A4 become entirely inoperable.   
 
 
Figure 10. Outcomes of Risk Mitigation Action When A1 and A4 Become Inoperable 
 
The mitigation action has a significant effect, even if it is not a solution that completely 
prevents an attack (Figures 9 and 10). Even after the acquisition of such products, operability 
values of assets can be decreased by 50 utils, the operability of the business processes only 
decreases by almost 11 utils. 
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Conclusion 
In order to assess the impact of possible cyber-attacks, decision-makers of an 
organization should consider the organization not only from an asset perspective but also from a 
business process perspective. The relationships among the assets and the business processes 
should be determined by considering how critical a business process is for the viability of the 
organization.  
Return on investment for the acquisition of cybersecurity products or services should be 
assessed by considering how it affects the business processes in addition to the assets of the 
organization. C-level decision-makers of an organization such as chief information security 
officer, chief information officer, and chief risk officer prefer considering the impact on the 
business processes in order to benchmark return on investment among several mitigation 
options. 
The developed risk-informed cybersecurity investment decision model quantifies impact 
by considering the ripple effects in an organization. Simulations that are conducted to test the 
effectiveness of the developed model show that even though all the assets look the same in 
importance, some of them are more critical because of the ripple effects that occur when they 
become inoperable.   
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